Set Theory and Logic


Refutation of Logical Theory Based on Compatible Consequence in Set Theory

Authors: Colin James III

We evaluate canonically logical compatibility relations (CM) and complements (CRS), each in three sets of definitions. None is tautologous, so we avoid the subsequent ten relations. This refutes the "the possibility of a notion of compatibility that allows either for glutty or gappy reasoning". (By extension, paraconsistent logic is rendered untenable.) Therefore the bivalent standard notion of formal theory in logic is confirmed as allowing both assertion and denial as equally valid. In fact, this refutation further disallows injection of a bilateralist approach on many dimensions. This also indirectly reiterates that set theory is not bivalent, and hence derivations therefrom, such as the instant relations, are non tautologous fragments of the universal logic VŁ4.

Comments: 3 Pages. © Copyright 2019 by Colin James III All rights reserved. Respond to author by email only: info@cec-services dot com. See updated abstract at (We warn troll Mikko at Disqus to read the article four times before hormonal typing.)

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[v1] 2019-03-08 09:52:22

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