Economics and Finance

1412 Submissions

[3] viXra:1412.0218 [pdf] submitted on 2014-12-22 18:39:37

Why People Punish in Public Goods Games, and on Whom Punishment is Most Effective: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Authors: Ramzi Suleiman, Yuval Samid
Comments: 37 Pages.

Theoretical and experimental research underscores the role of punishment in the evolution of cooperation between humans. Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and that withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation is explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a novel public good experiment with punishment and from 16 public goods experiments from countries around the world, we report results showing that revenge alone does not drive antisocial punishment of cooperators, and that such punishment is predominantly part of an upward and downward punishment strategy, presumably aimed at punishing those who deviate from the punisher’s aspired cooperation norm. More interestingly, we show that the effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation is mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, more than free riders being deterred. We also show that the anticipation of being punished is more effective in enhancing cooperation than the actual punishment itself, and that the ratio of strong reciprocators in a given social group is a potent predictor of the group’s level of cooperation and success in providing public goods.
Category: Economics and Finance

[2] viXra:1412.0180 [pdf] submitted on 2014-12-15 09:18:25

3D Method of the Analysis and Prediction of Driving of Stock Quotes in Short-Term Perspective. (Ru)

Authors: A.Antipin
Comments: 8 Pages. Версия на русском языке. The English version:

As a result of search of objective (settlement) methods of the analysis and forecasting of movement of the prices at a stock exchange, the fundamental role of parameter "the maximum deviation of the price from Open by the current moment sessions" (it is named "Base") has been found out. Base use allows to present session in the form of object with the developed geometrical form-structure. Structure elements are accurately enough localised in space. Structure, as a whole, keep the configuration, at least, some months. The object is a set of attractors to which the Price and "avoiding areas" for the Price is drawn. The object, as a whole, has 4 measured character. It is represented in three "spatial" variables plus the coding by colour. Variables are: the transaction Price, Base, a session Present situation, Probability of the transaction to occur till the end of session. All variables have unequivocal numerical character and, thus, are strictly objective. Spatial variables set conditions of realisation of the transaction, the coding colour shows probability of the transaction. In article the algorithm of construction of Object is given, the basic idea of practical use of Technology is described. For today the Technology works in current session, i.e. is applicable, while, to day-trading. Use of Technology and supervision with its help behind the market, has shown high degree of conformity of a reality. It has allowed to offer qualitative model for movement of the prices. (The English version:
Category: Economics and Finance

[1] viXra:1412.0147 [pdf] submitted on 2014-12-08 16:29:25

An Aspirations Model of Decisions in a Class of Ultimatum Games

Authors: Ramzi Suleiman
Comments: 35 Pages.

We propose a novel model of aspiration levels for interactive games, termed economic harmony. The model posits that the individuals' levels of outcome satisfaction are proportional to their actual outcomes relative to their aspired outcomes. We define a state of harmony as a state at which the interacting players' levels of outcome satisfaction are equal, and underscore the necessary condition for the manifestation and sustenance of harmony situations on the behavioral level. We utilize the proposed model to predict the transfer decisions in a class of two-person ultimatum games, including the standard ultimatum game, an ultimatum game with asymmetric information about the size of the "pie", an ultimatum game with varying veto power. We also apply the model to predicting behavior in a three person ultimatum game with uncertainty regarding the identity of the recipient and in a sequential common pool resource game. For all the aforementioned games, we show that the model accounts well for large sets of experimental data, and with the predictions of game theory and other relevant models of interactive situations. Strikingly, for the standard ultimatum game, the model predicts that the allocator should transfer a proportion of the entire sum that equals 1- Φ, where Φ is the famous Golden Ratio, most known for its aesthetically pleasing properties.
Category: Economics and Finance