

This experiment logically tests the Banach-Tarski Paradox as an equivalence and an implication.

At [en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banach-Tarski_paradox](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banach%E2%80%93Tarski_paradox) , we find after "[s]ome details fleshed out", Step 3:

$$S^2 = \dots = (E - D) \cup (S^2 - E) = S^2 - D \tag{1.1}$$

We assume the Meth8 apparatus using VL4, where the designated proof value is T tautology and F contradiction. The 16-value truth table is presented row major and horizontally.

LET: s S^2; q E; p D; = Equivalent to; ∪ + Or; ⊃ > Imply; - Not Or; & And

$$s = (((q-p)+(s-q)) = (s-p)) ; \quad \text{FTTF FTTF FTTF FTTF} \tag{1.2}$$

Because Eq. 1.2 is not tautologous, we weaken the argument for the equivalent to connective =, with replacement by the connective > Imply.

$$s > (((q-p)+(s-q)) > (s-p)) ; \quad \text{TTTT TTTT FTTF FTTF} \tag{1.3}$$

Eq. 1.3 is the equivalent to writing Eq 1.1 in the text symbols as:

$$S^2 \supset (E - D) \cup (S^2 - E) \supset S^2 - D. \tag{1.4}$$

While Eq. 1.3 is relatively less contradictory than Eq.1.2, it remains that both Eq. 1.1 and Eq. 1.4 in the text symbols remain as not tautologous.

This means the Banach-Tarski Paradox, as rendered, is not a paradox, not a theorem, and non-tautologous.

What follows is that the Von Neumann Paradox on the Euclidean plane is also suspicious as a paradox and possibly not a paradox.

Refutation of axiom of choice via refutation of the Gödel-Löb Axiom

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This example replicates the proof for provability logic of the Gödel-Löb axiom GL as $\Box(\Box p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \Box p$. If p is "*choice*", this transcribes in words to: "The necessity of *choice*, as always implying *a choice*, implies always *a choice*."

The axiom transcribes to $\#(\#p > p) > \#p$ for test input to Meth8 with output in Tab. 6. Model 2.2 is validated as one of five models. Hence by VL4 the Gödel-Löb axiom is suspect.

For the GL axiom to be validated in five of five models, the expression is rewritten as $\Box(\Box p \rightarrow p) \leftrightarrow (p \vee \neg p)$, in words: "The necessity of *choice*, as always implying *a choice*, is equivalent to always *a choice* or *no choice*."

A simpler rendition of a validated GL-type axiom is either $\Box(\Box \neg p \rightarrow p) \leftrightarrow \Box p$ or $\Box(\Box p \rightarrow \neg p) \leftrightarrow \Box \neg p$ as respectively in words: "The necessity of *no choice*, as always implying *a choice*, is equivalent to always *a choice*."; or "The necessity of *choice*, as always implying *no choice*, is equivalent to always *no choice*."

If GL fails, then so also does Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory and axiom of choice (ZFC) as the basis of modern mathematics.

Table 6

| Test input as processed is: $\#(\#p > p) > \#p$ | | | | |
|---|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Model 1 | Model 2.1 | Model 2.2 | Model 2.3.1 | Model 2.3.2 |
| $\#p$ | | | | |
| FNFN | UEUE | UUUU | UIUI | UPUP |
| p | | | | |
| FTFT | UEUE | UEUE | UEUE | UEUE |
| $\#(\#p > p)$ | | | | |
| NNNN | EEEE | UUUU | IIII | PPPP |
| $\#p$ | | | | |
| FNFN | UEUE | UUUU | UIUI | UPUP |
| $\#(\#p > p) > \#p$; not validated tautologous | | | | |
| CTCT | UEUE | <u>EEEE</u> | PEPE | IEIE |
| Model 1 | Model 2.1 | Model 2.2 | Model 2.3.1 | Model 2.3.2 |