

Refutation of Hegel's dialectical method

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We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VL4 where T is the designated *proof* value, F is contradiction, N is truthity (non-contingency), and C is falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table is row-major and horizontal. We evaluate the following in *one* variable of p .

From: Maybee, J. (2016). Hegel's dialectics. plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel-dialectics

Stage 1: p content; $\#p$ necessity of content;
 $\sim p$ determinate negation of content;
 $\sim\#p$ determinate nothingness of content;
 $>$ Imply, greater than, *becomes, becoming*;
 $<$ Not Imply, less than, *sublation*

Stage 2: $\%p$ possibility of content, *coherence*;
 $\%(\#p=\#p)$ immanence, T autology, proof,
 dialectics as “the principle through which alone *immanent coherence and necessity* enter into the content of science”

Stage 3: $\sim\#$ not necessity;
 $\%p$ some new idea;
 $<$ to show up from outside;
 $\%p<\#p$ self-sublation;

"because the form or determination that arises is the *result* of the self-sublation of the determination from the moment of understanding, there is no need for some new idea to show up from the outside." (3.1.1)

$(\%p<\#p)>\sim(\#(\%p<(\%p>\#p))=(p=p))$; TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT (3.1.2)

For example:

$\%p$ "somethings";
 $\sim\%p$ "some other things", something-others;

Being-for-itself (3.2.1)

$(\%p>\sim\%p)\&(\sim\%p>\%p)$; FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF (3.2.2)

"Being-for-itself embraces the something-others in its content" with a "process of passing back-and-forth between the something-others" (3.3.1)

$((\%p>\sim\%p)\&(\sim\%p>\%p))>((\sim\%p>\sim\%p)\&(\sim\%p<\sim\%p))$; TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT (3.3.2)

Stage 4: $(\%p<\#p)$ the finite;
 $\#(\%p<\#p)$ everything finite;
 "everything finite is: its own sublation" (4.1.1)

$\#(\%p<\#p)<\#(\%p<\#p)$; FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF (4.1.2)

$\#$ all;

#p all content;
 (p=p) genuine;
 < p nonexternal to p;
 > elevation above;
 (%p<#p) the finite;
 %(#p=#p) principle [dialectics]

“all genuine, nonexternal elevation above the finite is to be found in this principle [of dialectics]” (4.2.1)

((#(p=p)<#p)>(%p<#p))<%(#p=#p)) ; FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF (4.2.2)

Stage 5: "the result of the dialectical process is a new concept but one higher and richer than the preceding—richer because it negates or opposes the preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is the unity of itself and its opposite." (5.1.1)

%(#p=#p) > ((~#p>(%#p>#p))>(#p=#((%#p>#p)&~(%#p>#p)))) ; TCTC TCTC TCTC TCTC (5.1.2)

Stage 6: the “Absolute” for logic—as an oval that is filled up with and surrounds numerous, embedded rings of smaller ovals and circles, which represent all of the earlier and less universal determinations from the logical development (6.1.1)

#p>(%p>p) ; TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT (6.1.2)

Hegel’s entire philosophical system ... “presents itself therefore as a circle of circles” (6.2.1)

#p=(#p>(%p>p)) ; FNFN FNFN FNFN FNFN (6.2.2)

#(p=p) moving soul of scientific progression, necessity of proof ; “the dialectical constitutes the moving soul of scientific progression” (6.3.1)

(#p=(#p>(%p>p)))=#(p=p) ; CTCT CTCT CTCT CTCT (6.3.2)

As rendered, Eqs. 3.1.2, 3.3.2, and 6.1.2 are tautologous, but Eqs. 3.2.2, 4.1.2, 4.2.2, 5.1.2, 6.2.2, and 6.3.2 are *not* tautologous with Eqs. 3.2.2, 4.1.2, and 4.2.2 as contradictions.

In Stage 3, Eq. 3.2.2 the definition of Being-for-itself is a contradiction. Subsequently the main results for Stages 4, 5, and 6 are *not* tautologous.

We conclude that this refutes Hegel's dialectical method, and in only one variable.