Refutation of the Newcomb paradox

We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VŁ4 with `T`autology as the designated *proof* value, `F` as contradiction, `N` as truthity (non-contingency), and `C` as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table fragment) is row-major and horizontal.

LET p, q, r, s: A clear box; B opaque box; player; predictor;
& And; + Or; - Not Or; = Equivalent; > Imply, greater than; < Not Imply, less than;
% possibility, for one or some; # necessity, for all;
(%p>#p) truthity, content present; (%p<#p) = ((%p>#p)-(%p>#p)) falsity, content absent.

We ignore visibility states of boxes and hence dollar contents to test the logic.

From: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newcomb%27s_paradox

Box A contents visible and always set at $1,000.
Box B contents not visible and already set by the predictor:

If the predictor predicts the player takes both boxes A and B,
then box B contains nothing. (1.1)

(s>(r>(p&q)))>(q=(%p<#p)) ; `NNCC NNCC NNCC TTTC` (1.2)

If the predictor predicts that the player takes only box B,
then box B contains $1,000,000. (2.1)

(s>(r>   q)) >(q=(%p>#p)) ; `CCNN CCNN CCNN TTTN` (2.2)

Eqs. 1.2 and 2.2 as rendered are *not* tautologous, but also are *not* contadictory. This means the Newcomb paradox is *not* a paradox.

We test the two decision paths of the game as an Or tautology.

Either Eq. 1.2 or Eq. 2.2 (3.1)
((s>(r>(p&q)))>(q=(%p<#p)) + ((s>(r>   q)) >(q=(%p>#p)))
`TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT` (3.2)

This means the states of Newcomb together are tautologous, a theorem, and *not* contradictory or a paradox.