

## Refutation of the paradox of Moses Maimonides

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We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VL4 with  $\tau$  as the designated *proof* value,  $\text{F}$  as contradiction,  $\text{N}$  as truthity (non-contingency), and  $\text{C}$  as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table fragment ) is row-major and horizontal.

LET LET p q: God, man;  
 $\sim$  Not; & And; + Or; = Equivalent; @ Not Equivalent;  
 $>$  Imply, greater than;  $<$  Not Imply, less than; # necessity, for all; lie (s@s).  
 $(\%p\>\#p)$  good;  $(\%p\<\#p)$  bad;  $(p@p)$  imperfect, a lie.

From: [en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument\\_from\\_free\\_will](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_free_will)

Moses Maimonides formulated an argument regarding a person's free will, in traditional terms of good and evil actions, as follows:

Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad? (1.1)

$(p\>(q\>\%p\>\#p))+(p\>(q\>\%p\<\#p))$  ; TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT (1.2)

If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that the man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand he would act, (2.1)

$(p\>(q\>\%p\>\#p))\>(q\>(p\>(q\>\%p\>\#p)))$  ; TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT (2.2)

otherwise God's knowledge would be imperfect ... (3.1)

$((p\>(q\>\%p\>\#p))\>(q\>(p\>(q\>\%p\>\#p))))\<(p=(p@p))$  ; FTFT FTFT FTFT FTFT (3.2)

As rendered, Eqs. 1.2 and 2.2 are tautologous, *not* contradictory, theorems, and not paradoxes. Eq. 3.2, the further embellishment of Eq. 2.2, is *not* tautologous and *not* contradictory. Therefore the paradox of Maimonides is refuted as a paradox.