

Emotion Isn't First Principle

The Leading Professor Miguel Angel Sanchez-Rey [*The Grandmaster, The Master of Space-Time*]

The Physicalist Program

The Academy of Advance Science and the Technological Sciences

Non-propositional theory of emotional intentionality seems very much a first principle of bodily sensation and awareness. Neuroscience postulates the interplay between the nervous system and the brain. And that cognition is the byproduct of the brain state, i.e., the mind is the brain and yet the brain is the brain chemistry. When a child says (in natural language phonetic form [NL-PF]), “I’m thirsty!”

She feels the dryness in her tongue that produces an emotional-brain state of thirst. With the cognitive desire for saying, “Can I have a cup of water or milk?” Understood as the emotional intentionality of saying, “I have a cup, and so can I have a cup of water or milk?”

“Why is that Ellie?”

“I feel thirst.”

It looks like emotional intent is what drives the child to reason out a linguistic decision procedure that will quench her thirst. Yes, suppose another child says, “I feel ill, my nose is red? Why do I feel so sick?”

“I don’t know, John? Here let me take your temperature...Oh, dear: it’s 99.5 degrees Fahrenheit.”

So as an act of deductive inference, John’s mother deduces that John may have the flu. But John’s mother doesn’t specialize in child pediatrics. How does she know it’s the flu and not influenza? How does John’s mother say, “Yes, you must be sick? You look sick, all right. Do you feel a headache or chills?”

“I feel something, maybe chills?”

“Quick, let me take you to Doctor Sylvia to know for sure...”

The propositional statement, “I feel ill” is the propositional state that conveys the emotion of illness and/or disease. Which is an act of a particular nervous reaction to chills that interfaces with the brain computational module that conveys the feeling of cold and shakes.

By noticing pain -- through the emotion module, John can infer that he may have the flu-virus (or much worse, influenza). Is it the beginning of chicken pox or of a deadlier virulent disease pathology that a pediatrician, like Doctor Sylvia, may not be able to deduce for specialized treatment? And so, the emotion module -- that interfaces with the language module (known as the brain computational machine that harbors the human capacity for I (internal)-language), sets the stage for further inference that may lead to an adequate resolution.

The resolution of induction and deductive inference that gives way to a healthier mental state of normal temperature with a heightened state of awareness of relaxation and serenity. But yet John may have both a speech and learning disability which causes him to inadequately convey the proper symptom. Instead he conveys his sense of dizziness.

John's mother deduces that taking a nap may ease John's dizziness but fails to realize that John has fallen victim to a deadlier form of influenza. That the brain state for pain and emotion does not adequately interface with I-language.

Giving the mental state of pain and emotion, John instead outputs an NLF that is inconsistent with what is truly the nature of his illness. Does this mean that emotion is a first principle of a non-propositional theory of emotional intentionality?

John has falling victim to a coma. Yet it takes the expert decision-making of a blood specialist to deduce the cause. Through inference and deduction, the blood specialist -- using an electron microscope, observes the first novel virulent pathogen. With prior knowledge of biological engineering, the cure is found by isolating its genome that results in the quick development of a serum. Much quicker than a vaccine and more efficient than finding the original carrier of the pathogen.

Non-proposition with emotional intentionality, if little or no intention, is incompatible with a propositional statement that can deduce a proposition that is non-propositional. Without logocentrism, emotional intentionality outputs gibberish explanations. Whether or not non-propositional statements is the output of an individual's cognitive-brain state -- by way, of the interface of both the language and phonetic computational control (CompContr) module.

Either the determinant is from a hallucinogenic drug or even of a schizophrenic breakdown, emotion is not a first principle but *a module interface of the mind and/or brain cognitive-control architecture: the emotion adaptive processing chip [EMD-chip] that is the regulatory apparatus for optimal control of quantum master decision-algorithms (implied as the nature of anticipatory adaptive learning mechanisms that eventually surpass all formulations of current epigenetic biological evolution).*

Observing the behavioral state of dizziness and facial sweat may mean vertigo, but it doesn't mean that the winning strategy is to take two pills of pain medication. As the powerplay of an emotional state can deduce multiple winning strategies, if and only if, the winning strategy of multiple competing methodologies cannot comply with the winning strategy of logo-centric deductive inference that implies the nature of a person's emotional state. Emotional intentionality is not a winning strategy of bodily sensation and awareness, but one of many competing strategies in the powerplay of the cognitive psychology of speech judgements.

A strategy that requires propositional judgements to reach a conclusive propositional judgment of emotional intent. Conclusive in its logical intuitionism, grounded in its logo-centrism and phenomenological in its descriptive adequacy. A descriptive adequacy that can be infer, deduce and yet can output a winning strategy through the powerplay of epistemological rationalist-empiricism.