

Refutation of an epistemic logic for knowledge and probability

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Abstract: We evaluate axioms and definitions of an epistemic logic for knowledge and probability. Two equations are *not* tautologous, hence refuting the proposed epistemic logic.

We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VL4 with Tautology as the designated *proof* value, **F** as contradiction, **N** as truthity (non-contingency), and **C** as falsity (contingency). For results, the 16-valued truth table is row-major and horizontal, or repeating fragments of 128-tables, sometimes with table counts, for more variables. (See ersatz-systems.com.)

LET LET p,q,r,s: ϕ, x, T, t
 \sim Not, \neg ; + Or, \vee, \cup ; - Not Or; & And, \wedge, \cap ; \ Not And;
 $>$ Imply, greater than, $\rightarrow, \vdash, \mapsto, \succ, \supset$; $<$ Not Imply, less than, \in, \prec, \subset ;
 $=$ Equivalent, $\equiv, \vDash, :=, \iff, \leftrightarrow$; @ Not Equivalent, \neq ;
 $\%$ possibility, for one or some, \exists, \diamond, M ; # necessity, for every or all, \forall, \square, L ;
 $(z=z)$ T as tautology; $(z@z)$ F as contradiction, \emptyset, Null ;
 $(\%z\<\#z)$ C as contingency, Δ , ordinal 1;
 $(\%z\>\#z)$ N as non-contingency, ∇ , ordinal 2;
 $\sim(y < x)$ ($x \leq y$), ($x \subseteq y$); $(A=B)$ ($A \sim B$).

From: Tomović, S.; Ognjanović, Z.; Doder, D. (2019).
 A first-order logic for reasoning about knowledge and probability.
arxiv.org/pdf/1901.06886.pdf sinisatom@turing.mi.sanu.ac.rs

3. The axiomatization Ax_{PCKfo}

In this section we introduce the axiomatic system for the logic PCK^{fo} ... of the following axiom schemata and rules of inference:

I First-order axioms and rules

...

$$\text{FOR. } \frac{\phi}{\forall x\phi} \tag{3.1.6.1}$$

$$p\>(\#q\&p) ; \quad \mathbf{TFTF} \text{ TNTN } \mathbf{TFTF} \text{ TNTN} \tag{3.1.6.2}$$

Definition 3.3. A set T of formulas is saturated iff it is maximal consistent and the following condition holds:

$$\text{if } \neg(\forall x)\phi(x) \in T, \text{ then there is a term } t \text{ such that } \neg\phi(t) \in T. \tag{3.3.1}$$

$$((\sim p\&\#q)\<r)\>((\sim p\&\%s)\<r) ; \quad \mathbf{TTCT} \text{ TTTT } \mathbf{TTTT} \text{ TTTT} \tag{3.3.2}$$

Remark 3.3.2: The result is one falsity value C from tautology.

Eqs. 3.1.6.2 and 3.3.2 as rendered are *not* tautologous. This means the proposed epistemic logic for knowledge and probability is refuted.