

Refutation of definable operators on stable set lattices

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Abstract: We evaluate the definitions for the modal operators on stable set lattices. The operators are not respective negations and hence refute the definitions.

We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VL4 with Tautology as the designated proof value, **F** as contradiction, **N** as truthity (non-contingency), and **C** as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table is row-major and horizontal, or repeating fragments of 128-tables, sometimes with table counts, for more variables. (See ersatz-systems.com.)

LET \sim Not, \neg ; + Or, \vee, \cup ; - Not Or; & And, \wedge, \cap, \cdot ; \ Not And; > Imply, greater than, $\rightarrow, \Rightarrow, \mapsto, \succ, \supset, \vdash, \vDash, \rightarrow$; < Not Imply, less than, $\in, \prec, \subset, \#, \neq, \leftarrow, \lesssim$;
 = Equivalent, $\equiv, :=, \Leftrightarrow, \leftrightarrow, \triangleq, \approx, \simeq$; @ Not Equivalent, \neq ;
 % possibility, for one or some, \exists, \diamond, M ; # necessity, for every or all, \forall, \square, L ;
 (z=z) **T** as tautology, \top , ordinal 3; (z@z) **F** as contradiction, \emptyset , Null, \perp , zero;
 (%z<#z) **C** as contingency, Δ , ordinal 1; (%z>#z) **N** as non-contingency, ∇ , ordinal 2;
 $\sim(y < x)$ ($x \leq y$), ($x \subseteq y$); (A=B) (A~B).
 Note: For clarity we usually distribute quantifiers on each variable as designated.

From: Goldblatt, R. (2019). Definable operators on stable set lattices.
arxiv.org/pdf/1812.01264.pdf rob.goldblatt@msor.vuw.ac.nz

The key idea is that of a first-order definable operation on a stable set lattice, an idea that goes to the heart of Kripke's semantical interpretation of the modalities \square and \diamond . On the algebra of subsets of a Kripke frame (X,R), the modal connectives can be interpreted as operations assigning to each set $A \subseteq X$ the sets

$$\square A = \{x : \forall y(xRy \rightarrow y \in A)\} \text{ and} \quad (1.1)$$

LET $p, r, s, x, y: A, R, X, x, y$

$$\#p = (((x \& (r \& \#y)) \> (\#y < p)) \> x); \quad \begin{array}{cccc} \text{TCTC} & \text{TCTC} & \text{TCTC} & \text{TCTC} \end{array} (16), \\ \begin{array}{cccc} \mathbf{FNFN} & \mathbf{FNFN} & \mathbf{FNFN} & \mathbf{FNFN} \end{array} (16) \quad (1.2)$$

$$\diamond A = \{x : \exists y(xRy \& y \in A)\}. \quad (2.1)$$

$$\%p = (((x \& (r \& \%y)) \& (\%y < p)) \> x); \quad \begin{array}{cccc} \text{CTCT} & \text{CTCT} & \text{CTCT} & \text{CTCT} \end{array} (32) \quad (2.2)$$

The expressions defining the members of these sets can be seen as first order formulas in the binary predicate xRy and the unary predicate $y \in A$, leading to the 'standard translation' of the propositional modal language into a first-order language [...]. This ability to relate modal logic to a fragment of first-order logic does much to account for the success of the relational semantics revolution.

Remark 2.2: Eqs. 1.2 and 2.2 as rendered are *not* negations, and hence refute the definitions as a standard translation.