

## Refutation of definable operators on stable set lattices

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**Abstract:** We evaluate the definitions for the modal operators on stable set lattices. The operators are not respective negations and hence refute the definitions.

We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VL4 with Tautology as the designated proof value, **F** as contradiction, **N** as truthity (non-contingency), and **C** as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table is row-major and horizontal, or repeating fragments of 128-tables, sometimes with table counts, for more variables. (See ersatz-systems.com.)

LET  $\sim$  Not,  $\neg$ ; + Or,  $\vee, \cup$ ; - Not Or; & And,  $\wedge, \cap, \cdot$ ; \ Not And; > Imply, greater than,  $\rightarrow, \Rightarrow, \mapsto, \succ, \supset, \vdash, \vDash, \rightarrow$ ; < Not Imply, less than,  $\in, \prec, \subset, \#, \neq, \leftarrow, \lesssim$ ;  
 = Equivalent,  $\equiv, :=, \Leftrightarrow, \leftrightarrow, \triangleq, \approx, \simeq$ ; @ Not Equivalent,  $\neq$ ;  
 % possibility, for one or some,  $\exists, \diamond, M$ ; # necessity, for every or all,  $\forall, \square, L$ ;  
 (z=z) **T** as tautology,  $\top$ , ordinal 3; (z@z) **F** as contradiction,  $\emptyset$ , Null,  $\perp$ , zero;  
 (%z<#z) **C** as contingency,  $\Delta$ , ordinal 1; (%z>#z) **N** as non-contingency,  $\nabla$ , ordinal 2;  
 $\sim(y < x)$  ( $x \leq y$ ), ( $x \subseteq y$ ); (A=B) (A~B).

Note: For clarity we usually distribute quantifiers on each variable as designated.

From: Goldblatt, R. (2019). Definable operators on stable set lattices.  
[arxiv.org/pdf/1812.01264.pdf](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1812.01264.pdf) rob.goldblatt@msor.vuw.ac.nz

The key idea is that of a first-order definable operation on a stable set lattice, an idea that goes to the heart of Kripke's semantical interpretation of the modalities  $\square$  and  $\diamond$ . On the algebra of subsets of a Kripke frame (X,R), the modal connectives can be interpreted as operations assigning to each set  $A \subseteq X$  the sets

$$\square A = \{x : \forall y(xRy \rightarrow y \in A)\} \text{ and} \quad (1.1)$$

LET  $p, r, s, x, y: A, R, X, x, y$

$$\#p = (((x \& (r \& \#y)) \> (\#y < p)) \> x); \quad \begin{array}{cccc} \text{TCTC} & \text{TCTC} & \text{TCTC} & \text{TCTC} \\ \text{FNFN} & \text{FNFN} & \text{FNFN} & \text{FNFN} \end{array} (16), \quad (1.2)$$

$$\diamond A = \{x : \exists y(xRy \& y \in A)\}. \quad (2.1)$$

$$\%p = (((x \& (r \& \%y)) \& (\%y < p)) \> x); \quad \text{CTCT CTCT CTCT CTCT} (32) \quad (2.2)$$

The expressions defining the members of these sets can be seen as first order formulas in the binary predicate  $xRy$  and the unary predicate  $y \in A$ , leading to the 'standard translation' of the propositional modal language into a first-order language [...]. This ability to relate modal logic to a fragment of first-order logic does much to account for the success of the relational semantics revolution.

**Remark 2.2:** Eqs. 1.2 and 2.2 as rendered are *not* negations, and hence refute the definitions as a standard translation.