

Refutation of the Goldblatt-Thomason theorem

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Abstract: From the introduction, we evaluate the terms forth and back as a duality. Neither is negation of the other, hence refuting the core basis of the Goldblatt-Thomason theorem. The question posed by it is further answered by the universal logic $\forall\exists\Box$ that expresses by modal axioms *all* first-order definable properties of a binary relation, due to equivalences of the respective quantifier and modal operator.

We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/ $\forall\exists\Box$ with Tautology as the designated proof value, **F** as contradiction, **N** as truthity (non-contingency), and **C** as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table is row-major and horizontal, or repeating fragments of 128-tables, sometimes with table counts, for more variables. (See ersatz-systems.com.)

LET \sim Not, \neg ; $+$ Or, \vee, \cup ; $-$ Not Or; $\&$ And, \wedge, \cap, \cdot ; \setminus Not And; $>$ Imply, greater than, $\rightarrow, \Rightarrow, \mapsto, \succ, \supset, \vdash, \models, \rightarrow$; $<$ Not Imply, less than, $\in, \prec, \subset, \#, \neq, \leftarrow, \lesssim$;
= Equivalent, $\equiv, :=, \iff, \leftrightarrow, \triangleq, \approx, \simeq$; @ Not Equivalent, \neq ;
% possibility, for one or some, \exists, \diamond, M ; # necessity, for every or all, \forall, \square, L ;
($z=z$) **T** as tautology, \top , ordinal 3; ($z@z$) **F** as contradiction, $\emptyset, \text{Null}, \perp$, zero;
($\%z<\#z$) **C** as contingency, Δ , ordinal 1; ($\%z>\#z$) **N** as non-contingency, ∇ , ordinal 2;
 $\sim(y < x)$ ($x \leq y$), ($x \subseteq y$); ($A=B$) ($A\sim B$).
Note: For clarity we usually distribute quantifiers on each variable as designated.

From: Goldblatt, R. (2019). Morphisms and duality for polarities and lattices with operators. arxiv.org/pdf/1902.09783.pdf rob.goldblatt@msor.vuw.ac.nz

1 Introduction

We develop here a new notion of ‘bounded morphism’ between certain structures that model propositional logics lacking the distributive law for conjunction and disjunction. Our theory adapts a well known semantic analysis of modal logic, which we now review.

There are two main types of semantical interpretation of propositional modal logics. In *algebraic* semantics, formulas of the modal language are interpreted as elements of a modal algebra (B, f) , which comprises a Boolean algebra B with an additional operation f that interprets the modality \diamond and preserves finite joins. In *relational* semantics, formulas are interpreted as subsets of a Kripke frame (X, R) , which comprises a binary relation R on a set X .

The relationship between these two approaches is explained by a *duality* that exists between algebras and frames. This is fundamentally category-theoretic in nature. The modal algebras are the objects of a category MA whose arrows are the standard algebraic homomorphisms. The Kripke frames are the objects of a category KF whose [*sic*] arrows are the *bounded morphisms*, $\alpha: (X, R) \rightarrow (X', R')$, i.e. functions $\alpha: X \rightarrow X'$ satisfying the ‘back and forth’ conditions

(Forth): xRy implies $\alpha(x)R'\alpha(y)$. (1.1.1.1)

Remark 1.1.1.1: The Forth label is later interchanged with the confusing name of preservation.

LET $p, r, s, w, x, y, z: \alpha, R, R', \beta, x, y, z$

$(x \& (r \& y)) \> ((p \& x) \& (s \& (p \& y)))$; TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT (48),
TTTT **FFFF** TTTT **FTFT** (16) (1.1.1.2)

(Back): $\alpha(x)R'z$ implies $\exists y(xRy \& \alpha(y)=z)$. (1.1.2.1)

Remark 1.1.2.1: The Back label is later interchanged with the confusing name of reflection.

$((p \& x) \& (s \& z)) \> ((x \& (r \& \%y)) \& ((p \& \%y)=z))$;
TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT (80),
TTTT TTTT **FTFT** TCTC (16),
TTTT TTTT TTTT TTTT (16),
TTTT TTTT **FTFT** TTTT (16) (1.2.2.2)

(Bounded morphisms are also known as p-morphisms. The adjective ‘bounded’ derives from the R-bounded existential quantification in (1.2.1).)

Remark 1.n: Eqs. 1.1.2.1 and 1.2.2.2 as rendered are not respective negations. This refutes Forth and Back as a *duality*.

12 Goldblatt-Thomason theorem

This theorem [pay-to-play reference, from 1975] was originally formulated as an answer to the question:

which first-order definable properties of a binary relation can be expressed by modal axioms? (12.1.1)

Remark 12.1.1: The universal logic $V\mathcal{L}4$ answers Eq. 12.1.1 as:

"all first-order definable properties of a binary relation can be expressed by modal axioms" because in the universal logic $V\mathcal{L}4$ the respective quantifiers are equivalent to the modal operators. (12.1.2)