

WHITHER UKRAINE: THROUGH THE GLASS DARKLY

Gennady Shkliarevsky

Abstract: The article offers an analysis of the two main trends in Ukrainian politics that offer different approaches in addressing the problems faced by Ukrainian society. One tendency advocates reliance on government institutions and formal bureaucratic practices. The other represents the radically inclined militant activists who insist on immediate radical action that will eliminate corruption and treason in the country. The standoff between these two trends prolongs the war in Ukraine and is harmful to the country. It hinders the resolution of the military conflict that is ruining the country and makes rebuilding its economy and improving the life of Ukrainian citizens more difficult, if not impossible. The article also analyzes the political practice of president Zelensky who largely pursues the approach advocated by the radicals.

Key words: Ukraine, Zelensky, corruption, radicals, “Right Sector,” Maidan

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.16817.56165

The turmoil in Ukraine is gaining strength. Although it has been going on for close to a decade, it shows no sign of abatement. On the contrary, its intensity is constantly growing. How long will this war continue? How will it end? What will be Ukraine like after the war is over? These questions are on many people’s minds, and not just in Ukraine but the world over. The view that in many ways the fate of the world depends on what happens in Ukraine is in ascendance.

There is no shortage of theories that try to answer the above questions. They all seek answers in determining the nature of this conflict and the factors that have shaped it. They hope that the directions they pursue will lead them to answers.

Some see this conflict as a manifestation of traditional rivalries between Russia and Ukraine. Their interpretation follows the romantic narrative trope that gives the war in Ukraine the appearance of the struggle between good and evil, between authoritarian/autocratic Russia and freedom-loving Ukraine, or between democracy and despotism. The romantic trope in this narrative may be appealing but it is not particularly illuminating. In reality, neither Russia is the epitome of evil, nor, on close analysis, Ukraine appears to embody all that is virtuous and good. Reality proves to be far more complicated than what literary tropes allow.

There are other interpretations that focus on cultural differences between the left- and the right-bank Ukraine that supposedly have had a lasting and pervasive influence on the history of the country. These differences, so the explanation goes, have unleashed their destructive force several times in the course of Ukrainian history when opportune moments arose. This time an opportune moment came in 2014 when a popular movement that was based primarily in the right bank, or in western Ukraine, overthrew the regime of then-president Victor Yanukovich. The goal of the insurrection was not merely to get rid of the corrupt leader with allegedly pro-Russian sympathies, but also,

and most importantly, to cut the country's ties to Russia and bring Ukraine into the European community of nations.

Finally, there are more pragmatic perspectives that explain the current turmoil in terms of Russia's insidious attempts to recreate the empire that was destroyed by the collapse of Communism. In this view, Ukraine is central to the success of this project hatched in the minds of the Kremlin planners. Finally, there are still others and less significant perspectives that need not be covered here.

All three major theories deserve attention. They all make points that are at least to some extent valid. However, they have one common problem: they all tell only part of the story--their own part. They exclude and contradict each other. The solutions they offer reflect this major shortcoming. They are partial, subjective, and, ultimately, arbitrary. This article will take a different approach. Rather than base its interpretation on some fundamental assumption—historical or cultural—it will focus on current pressures and tensions in Ukrainian politics that are driving this conflict.

Those who have been following recent Ukrainian history remember the events that took place 2014 when political activists gathered in the Independence Square in Kiev and created an encampment. They called it Maidan (or “square” in Ukrainian). That development was the initial salvo in the current conflict.

The trigger that activated the Maidan was the decision by the erstwhile president of Ukraine Victor Yanukovich to delay the country's entry into the European Union. The protesters demanded that this decision be rescinded. However, they also had a much broader agenda. They wanted to re-orient Ukraine the entire direction in the country's evolution toward the European Union and away from Russia. The insurgents eventually succeeded in overthrowing president Yanukovich—an event that had profound consequences that eventually led to the current war.

The Maidan of 2014 was not a unique event in the recent history of Ukraine. There were several other Maidans that preceded it. They all were part of the movement that pursued a fundamental political, cultural, and social transformation of Ukraine. It was a true revolution. The movement had a distinct egalitarian character. Its ultimate goal was to eliminate elite rule in the country and open a new page in the history of Ukraine and indeed the entire world. It clearly had global pretensions.

Protests against elites and hierarchies were not unique to Ukraine either. We still remember the protests in the Tiananmen Square, the Arab Spring, the color revolutions in the CIS, the Occupy Wall Street movement, the Islamic jihad, student protests in Hong Kong and many other developments that constituted a global phenomenon. This global unrest toppled governments, changed regimes, and shook the entire global political order to its foundation. It engulfed countries as diverse as Thailand, Greece, the United States, Syria, Argentina, Afghanistan, Great Britain and of course Ukraine. No country seemed to be immune to the awesome power of this ongoing unrest.

There are numerous theories that try to explain the cause or causes of this global turmoil. Although much has been written on the subject, this turmoil continues to inspire debates, discussions, and numerous publications.¹ A definitive understanding of this global phenomenon remains elusive.

It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed analysis of this cataclysmic development. Such analysis has been undertaken elsewhere and need not be rehearsed here.² The sole reason for bringing up the global unrest in this article is

merely to point to the relationship between the development in Ukraine and this global phenomenon.

Just like other events of the global unrest, the Maidan of 2014 displayed very vividly a profound chasm that separated political elites and hierarchies from the popular movement of Maidan activists. The participants of the Maidan intensely disliked members of the government, politicians, bureaucrats, and oligarchs. The word “dislike” does not really capture the intensity of the feeling experienced by the activists. A more appropriate word would be “hatred.” In view of Maidan activists, elites were enemies of Ukraine. They were the source of corruption and oppression. They were the reason why Ukraine could not be a free country. This hatred of elites and hierarchies was extremely intense, not to say pathological.

One can sense this pathology in the words of Dmytro Yarosh, the leader of the Pravyi Sektor (the Right Sector—one of the most radical and influential nationalist organizations in Ukraine) and the commander of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army. For example, in the ultimatum that he published in 2014, Yarosh writes:

In my Ukraine, the bureaucrats—those who should serve citizens but are (in fact) embezzlers and Derzhimordas (a brutal police character from Gogol’s play “The Inspector General”) who must be put in jails, not given armchairs (symbol of bureaucrats) . . . [These] enemies of Ukraine, collaborators, and opportunists should be in the position to interfere with the choices of Ukrainian citizens . . . We cannot allow these scammers and dealers to hold at ransom the future of our descendents.³

Characteristically, Yarosh finishes his statement by promising that he “will never join the power elites.”⁴

Yarosh addressed his ultimatum to the then-president of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko. The attachment to the ultimatum contained a barely concealed threat. Yarosh demanded that the president should purge the ranks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVS) from corrupt officials. If he refused to do so, Yarosh added, “the Right Sector will help him in this task.” “We really count on the president,” Yarosh continued, “to put in place these pigs in police uniforms who have become fat on bribes, kickbacks, and the blood of Ukrainian warriors.”⁵

The reaction of from MVS was not long in waiting. Few hours after the publication of the ultimatum, Arsen Avakov, then minister of internal affairs, wrote: “It has finally started . . . this next disinformation stream that the Right Sector made from its obscurity indicates that the elections are close.” Avakov then proceeded to criticize Yarosh for his manipulative behavior and cowardice. The minister also referred to criminal activities perpetrated by members of the Right Sector.

It was not before long that Borislav Bereza, the head of the press center of the Right Sector, and Anton Gerashchenko, a counselor of the minister of internal affairs, joined in the acrimonious exchange. Bereza accused the minister and his counselor of stalling the purge of the ministry. Gerashchenko for his part accused Yarosh and Bereza of creating instability by trying to score political points. He called the ultimatum against “legitimately and democratically elected officials” a pathetic “public relations stunt” that endangered the country. Oleg Liashko, a deputy of the Ukrainian parliament, intimidated

that the ultimate author of the ultimatum was not Yarosh or Bereza but Ihor Kolomoisky—an insidious and shadowy figure in Ukrainian politics and one of the richest people in Ukraine—who has been credited for bringing Zelensky to power.⁶

There is no point in disentangling the web of mutual accusations and recriminations that were traded in this feud. All one needs is a cursory glance to see that there is no love lost between the members of the Poroshenko's government and political radicals who used anti-corruption rhetoric to capitalize on the moods of the disaffected public. It was power struggle pure and simple that between the two trends in Ukrainian politics: one that advocated a statist approach in resolving the country's problems and the other that insisted on an immediate and radical action. The Right Sector was only one of the radical organizations that spearheaded attacks on the government.

The differences between the rivals were further enhanced and accentuated by the events during the Maidan when snipers from "Omega" and "Sokol"—the two elite units of the MVS—shot Maidan activists during the skirmishes on the Institutkaia street. The statement by Gennady Moskal, a deputy of the Ukrainian parliament, confirmed this fact. It named a number of high officials from MVS and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) as those directly responsible for giving orders to shoot.⁷

The above is not to create an impression that Maidan was all about manipulations of the protestors by insidious puppet masters. There is no doubt that for many Maidan activists the ideals of equality and justice were the main source of inspiration. Indeed, they held these ideals very close to their heart; they were willing to make sacrifices and even risk their life to realize these ideals. The problem, though, was that did not know and had no specific plan as to how these ideals could be realized. This fact was (and still is) the most important source of frustration among the participants of the Maidan movement. Yet, although this fact was in full view, the activists did not recognize it. Rather they put the blame, and still do, for their continued failure on political elites. Their frustration has turned into anger that they have directed and continue to direct against political elites and government bureaucracy.

The object of hatred for the Maidan activists was not so much some individual members of the government bureaucracy or even bureaucracy as a whole. They hated the very principle of hierarchy that made bureaucracy possible. They saw all hierarchies as the evil source of corruption, inequality, and oppression and as the main obstacle to the liberation of Ukraine.

The attitudes of the activists toward hierarchies conceal an unresolved paradox. They hate hierarchies but they do not really know what to do about them. Somewhere deep inside they realize that the country cannot do without hierarchies, that they are necessary, and that they are, so to say, a necessary evil. Indeed, what are they to do if they succeed in destroying all hierarchies and getting completely rid of hierarchical interactions? After all, hierarchies play an essential role in running the country and its institutions. What would an army, government institutions, or bureaucracies look like without hierarchies? They would not be able to function and perform the important, indeed essential, role they play in sustaining the state and its functions. If the activists remove all current members of bureaucracy, they will have to fill in their shoes. That is the prospect that they fear and abhor the most. Once they become part of hierarchies, they will inevitably become complicit in inequality and oppression associated with the

very principle of hierarchies; in other words, they themselves will become part of the evil that they seek to destroy.

Maidan activists see their mission in bringing freedom and equality to Ukraine. They view this mission as sacred and they do not want to forfeit it. I remember talking to some Maidan activists back in 2014 and later. I told them many times that they should enter the government and pursue the realization of their ideal in a constructive and systematic way. They did not want to hear about it. They saw themselves as the warrior of truth and justice--the bearers of the very spirit of freedom. Their ideal was, and still is, the much-mythologized community of Ukrainian Cossacks of the past. They use this mythology in lieu of a practical guide. They see themselves as heirs to this sacred tradition and they would rather die than betray this utopian vision.

The discussions that I had back in 2014 and later with Maidan activists have finally helped me understand the reason for their failure to resolve the paradox in their view of hierarchies. They see themselves heralds of the future society of equals. They see their destiny in showing the entire world, not just Ukraine, the path to liberation from elite domination. Yet, they find themselves in a precarious damned-if-you-do-and-damned-if-you-don't situation. They have no idea how they can reconcile the two principles: the principle of hierarchies and the principle of equality. Moreover, they do not even try to reconcile them. They do not believe that hierarchical and non-hierarchical interactions can be reconciled. In fact, they view these two types of interactions as diametrically opposed to each other and totally irreconcilable. They did not and do not see any possibility for a resolution of this conflict, and this fact is deeply perturbing. Consequently, in their view, the opposition between the principle of hierarchy and the principle of equality can only have palliative solutions, not a principal one.

There were two palliatives that they considered back in 2014. Some proposed that the activists should form a kind of Praetorian Guard force, similar to the guards in the Roman Empire. These guards were to have a special status--a kind of extra-legal body. They would have arms. They also would be located in the capital in close proximity to the government and its institutions. By virtue on their location, they would have a direct and easy access to government officials. As a result, they would be able to interfere with the work of the government and its institution and prevent the spread of corruption. They would represent a kind of super agency that would protect republic and republican virtues from corrupted officials; the latter would find themselves under a constant threat of immediate and severe retribution.

There was also another scheme. This scheme envisioned the Maidan as a permanent institution; in a way, this would be the institutionalization of the very practice of direct and permanent representation of the will of the people. Encamped in the central square of the capital city, the Maidan would serve as a permanent reminder of the awesome power of the Ukrainian people, of their inalienable right to intervene at any point into the affairs of the state and prevent the usurpation of power by corrupt officials. The Maidan would serve as a constant reminder to corrupt officials of the inevitable and just retribution for their transgressions.

These were the only two possible palliative solutions that, in views of the Maidan activists, could guarantee the survival of Ukraine as a republic of equals. They even began to use the word "brother," or *pobratym*, as a new form that citizens of the republic of equals were to use in addressing each other. This form of address has eventually been

adopted by the activists and in the Ukrainian Volunteer Army, the Right Sector, the Azov brigade, and others; it is also in use in the regular Ukrainian army.

The attempt to institutionalize the Maidan collapsed soon after the overthrow of Yanukovich and the election of Petro Poroshenko as the first post-Maidan president of Ukraine. The encampment in the Independence Square was dismantled and removed; its armed guards were dispatched to the east of Ukraine to fight against secessionists. However, the dismantling of the Maidan has not ended the influence of radicalism; radical insurgents have persisted in their attacks against “corruption and treason” and have continued to pose a threat to government institutions and state officials. Driven by apocalyptic egalitarian expectations, the radicals continued their fight and for the republic of equals; and they had guns to make their threats credible.

The post-Maidan government led by Petr Poroshenko desperately tried to rein in elemental radical energies of political activism. Poroshenko and his cohort were essentially statist. They maximized their efforts to rebuild the state, or what they call *derzhava*, and its institutions. These efforts inevitably brought them into conflict with radical activists. The government even had to resort to the use of force against them. The episode that involved Alexander Muzychko, nicknamed Sashko Bilyi, is a good illustration of this uncompromising struggle. Muzychko was a political activist, a member of the nationalist organization UNA-UNSO, and coordinator of the Right Sector in western Ukraine. He vowed to fight to death against “communists, Jews, and Russians for as long as blood flows in my veins.”⁸ A raid organized by the government ended his career. It killed Muzychko on March 24, 2014, in the town of Barmaky in Ukraine. Muzychko was 52 at the time of his death.

As this struggle evolved, a complete victory eluded the statist led by Poroshenko. They ultimately failed to neutralize their radical opponents who continued to snipe at government officials and bureaucrats. Eventually, the radicals gained the upper hand. The Poroshenko administration collapsed and a new government was installed.

With the election of Zelensky as president of Ukraine, the balance of power shifted in favor of the radicals. The rise of Zelensky was nothing short of meteoric. One day he was a popular comedian and the next day he was president of the country. Whoever orchestrated Zelensky’s election (some speculate that Kolomoisky was instrumental in this change) knew what they were doing. First, Zelensky was cast in the principal role of a popular serial appropriately entitled “The Servant of the People.” The main character in the movie is a man of the people who understands the needs of ordinary citizens. He unexpectedly becomes president and spearheads an uncompromising assault on bureaucrats and corrupt officials. The movie has dramatically changed the public image of Zelensky from one of a successful comedian and entrepreneur to one of a populist leader who stands up for ordinary people.

The election of Zelensky involved more than changes in his public image. It marked a transformation of political culture and practice in Ukraine. In contrast to Poroshenko who relied primarily on bureaucracy and state institutions, Zelensky’s approach to governance is less formal and very personal. He surrounds himself with members of his own entourage who are personally loyal to him. Zelensky eschews bureaucrats and formal bureaucratic rules. He is much more comfortable in the informal company of his loyalists.

Instead of institutions and formal rules, Zelensky rules by personal orders and decrees, frequently bypassing government agencies and officials. He has even bypassed the popular Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny by approving specific military operations on his own authority. Zelensky, for example, has personally authorized the raid on the town of Belgorod and its civilian population perpetrated by the so-called Russian Volunteer Corps—the unit of the Russian neo-Nazis—on Russian territory.⁹ One should point out that the American government and the NATO have specifically, and at least verbally, warned against conducting such operations.

The policies that Zelensky has pursued since his election have become increasingly radical and dictatorial. He has spearheaded the campaign against “corruption” that he conveniently uses to eliminate his critics and opponents. Zelensky does not shy from harassing and intimidating members of the Ukrainian government and parliament. On occasions, he could walk into the chamber of the parliament and hand subpoenas from the military to those he identified as “corrupt” or “treasonous.” These individuals were been forced to enlist and go to the front to fight in the war. Zelensky has decisively suppressed opposition parties and has expanded censorship. He has approved a campaign of persecutions against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its members.

Zelensky’s campaign against “corruption” illustrates his proximity to radical political activists. Under the pretext of the fight against “corruption,” Zelensky and his clique are literally terrorizing members of the bureaucracy, which incidentally also helps Zelensky to placate militant activists and strengthen his hold on power. The result of this policy is the intensification of the conflict between the president and his clique, on one hand, and members of the government and bureaucracy, on the other. The public discussions of the recent arrest of Vsevolod Kniazev, President of the Supreme Court, reveal the subterranean tectonic tremors behind the façade of unity. Kniazev has been arrested on charges of bribery and corruption for allegedly taking a bribe in the amount of \$2.7 million.¹⁰ Even though the case is still in very initial stages of investigation, the radicals are already trying this case in public media and in the court of public opinion.

Some examples from these acrimonious exchanges illustrate the point. Many activists have responded with angry posts to this scandal. Artur Mokriak, a political activist and a member of the Movement for Direct Democracy, is one of thousands of other voices of Ukrainian radicalism. In one of his Facebook posts that Mokriak published on May 24, 2023, in the wake of the eruption of the Kniazev scandal, he writes:

The nature of the Ukrainian state today . . . is usurpation of the primary sovereign direct power of the Ukrainian people. A possibility that the mendacious deep state of the post-Soviet neo-feudal nomenclature of the Azarovs, the Yatseniukovs, the Hetmantsevs, and the Shmygals [all names mentioned are those of members of Ukrainian political elite] will be able to “weasel” their way out after the victory [in the current war], as was the case in 2004, 2014, and 2019 is very high . . . Those in power have successfully digested chaotic Maidan revolutions, creating an even more powerful form of usurpation; they provoked the wide-scale aggression of Putin’s Russia.¹¹

Mokriak laments the fact that the Ukrainian people have not resisted enough corrupt officials who he calls “internal occupiers” and “the usurpers of people’s power.” He sees the solution in self-organization of the Ukrainian people and the creation of a people’s republic that would be based on self-governing territorial communities, or polities. He points to the commune (*gromada*) of the Stryi region as a model for future Ukraine.¹² Such inflammatory statements cause immediate and angry responses from many Ukrainians who are confused and exhausted by the on-going war.

In his response to the Kniazev affair on behalf of MVS, Anton Gerashchenko, a counselor of the ministry has cautioned against imprudent and rash actions. His rebuttal to critics is reasoned and judicious. He particularly addresses insinuations that the ministry is full of corrupt officials and that is the reason why the ministry often appoints corrupt officials, including judges. Gerashchenko strongly objects to such hasty, summary, and unsupported generalizations. He argues that there is no ideal way of selecting officials that gives a 100% guarantee against corruption. He thoughtfully points to problems in the judicial system and in society at large that create conditions propitious for corruption. He sees the solution in gradual and persistent education of government officials and the public, and in instilling the culture of zero-tolerance toward bribes, both among government officials and citizens who, in his opinion, bear at least part of the blame for bribery and corruption. According to Gerashchenko, this process can only be gradual and is likely to take years, if not decades.

Gerashchenko is obviously walking a thin line. He does not want to antagonize the radicals and has to be very cautious about what he writes. But his response gives a clear sense that he decries irresponsible accusations and actions that paralyze government institutions and considers them unconstructive, counterproductive, and ultimately harmful. In contrast to sloganeering by radical activists, Gerashchenko’s reply is that of an experienced professional who fully understands the enormity of the tasks that the government faces. His wise and measured words stand in stark contrast to radical demands of immediate and decisive action by political activists.¹³

The exchange over the Kniazev affair is an eloquent example of the standoff between the two opposing trends that are currently tearing Ukraine apart. They propose two different solutions to the current conundrum, two different courses of action. One course is toward strengthening the role of institutions, professionals, and bureaucracy. The other course calls for an immediate and uncompromising action against corruption and treason. There does not seem to be any reconciliation possible between the institutional and radical approach. Yet the future of Ukraine vitally depends on such reconciliation.

Ukraine’s future under Zelensky appears to be bleak, very bleak. If the country continues on the current course, all promises of peace are idle speculations. There will be no peace either in the near future; it may even take a decade or longer to bring peace to the country. Modern wars require more than just brave soldiers, capable commanders, and good weapons. They also require strong institutions, capable bureaucracies, and efficient economies. Zelensky obviously is incapable of meeting these needs. The reason is not only his lack of knowledge, skills, experience, or a clear rational vision (although all of these are very important). The main reason why Zelensky and his clique cannot achieve these goals is the fact that they do not even formulate them. They can only set

goals for war, not peace. Peace is far more difficult and requires strong institutions. Zelensky does not even talk about strengthening government institutions. Zelensky and his associates pursue a confusing and opportunistic course that eschews any systematic and rational approach.

In his actions, Zelensky goes with the flow; and the dominant flow today is not in favor of constructive and rational policies. Under the guise of patriotism, this radical trend stokes up fears of conspiracy, treason, and corruption. It is opposed to the institutions and formal rules. It largely sees bureaucrats and government functionaries as enemies and “internal occupiers” who are as bad--perhaps even much worse and more dangerous-- as the Russians who have invaded the country. Indeed, there are many corrupt officials in the Ukrainian government, courts, and the police force, but name one country where corruption is not just as bad or possibly even worse. One cannot and should not throw out the baby with the bath water. Fighting against corruption should not serve as a pretext for disrupting order that stability and paralyzing government institutions.

Instead of institutions and formal rules, Zelensky relies on personal orders and decrees.

This practice is almost medieval in its approach. It is counterproductive and utterly harmful. It cannot bring peace and rebuild the economy in Ukraine, no matter how much assistance the United States and NATO will give to the country. Institutions and orderly governments are central to Western polities. The West cannot win the war for Ukraine; it cannot rebuild Ukrainian economy. Western assistance can only produce results only if Ukraine has an efficient government and stable institutions; a government that shares with the West not only some spiritual values but also practical approaches toward governance. In the absence of such government, the practices that are fundamental for the West will inevitably clash with those practices that are currently dominant in Ukraine. The results may be dire. By collaborating with the radical trends in Ukraine, Western allies may help to create a monster that will be far worse than the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Radicalism may lead to the rise of uncoordinated guerilla warfare carried out by largely autonomous bands of militants armed with the most modern and sophisticated weapons. These bands will be fighting for their survival and no holds will be barred. In order to survive, these bands will use any means available to them. They will trade arms, human organs, and drugs; they will engage in human trafficking and supporting prostitution. But most importantly, they will offer their services to anyone who will be willing to pay. Like Afghanistan, Ukraine will become a source of instability and terrorism. But things will be different this time since Ukraine is not some distant God-forsaken country. It is located right in the heart of Europe. It will be extremely difficult to put this genie back in the bottle.

The people of Ukraine cannot solve the problems they face by slogans and radical actions. These can only make things worse, perhaps even much worse. Ukraine needs stable institutions and rational approaches, not improvisations or radical ideologies that promote myths from the past spiced combined with extremist sloganeering. Yet in the current make-up Zelensky needs the militants and the militants need him. This mutual dependency creates a vicious circle of mutual dependency that is ruining the country and its future.

ENDNOTES

¹ M. Sitrin, “Goals without Demands: The New Movements for Real Democracy,” *South Atlantic Quarterly*, vol. 113, no. 2 (2014), pp. 245–58; Paul Mason. *Why It’s Still Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions* (London: Verso, 2013); Gennady Shkliarevsky, “Rethinking Democracy: A Systems Perspective on the Global Unrest.” *Systems Research and Behavioral Science*, vol. 33, no. 3 (2016), pp. 452–70.

² Gennady Shkliarevsky, “Rethinking Democracy.”

³ Дмитро Ярош, “Трошки про державотворення,” *InfoResist*, May 26, 2023, <https://inforesist.org/ua/troshki-pro-derzhavotvorennya/>.

⁴ Ярош, “Трошки про державотворення.”

⁵ Дарья Калиновская, “‘Ультиматум Яроша’: как отреагировали МВД, Ляшко и, что им ответил ‘Правый сектор,’” *056.ua* (Сайт міста Дніпра), August 17, 2014, <https://www.056.ua/news/599314/ultimatum-arosa-kak-otreagirovali-mvd-lasko-i-cto-im-otvetil-pravyj-sektor-video>.

⁶ Дарья Калиновская, “‘Ультиматум Яроша.’”

⁷ “Москаль: На Институтской Были Снайперы ‘Омеги’ и ‘Сокола,’” *Insider*, February 2, 2014, <http://www.theinsider.ua/rus/politics/530b14080753b/>.

⁸ *Wikipedia*, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oleksandr_Muzychko

⁹ “Русский добровольческий корпус”—это подразделение ВСУ? Российские партизаны? Или агенты ФСБ?” *Meduza*, March 2, 2023, <https://meduza.io/feature/2023/03/02/russkiy-dobrovolcheskiy-korpus-eto-podrazdelenie-vsuv-rossiyskie-partizany-ili-agenty-fsb>; “Who are the Freedom of Russia Legion and other armed fighters in Belgorod?” *Reuters*, May 23, 2023,

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-are-armed-fighters-russias-belgorod-region-2023-05-23/>.

¹⁰ “Арест Князева: ВАКС рассмотрит апелляцию касательно избранной меры пресечения,” *Focus*, May 29, 2023, <https://focus.ua/ukraine/569311-arest-knyazeva-vaks-rassmotrit-apellyaciyu-kasatelno-izbrannoy-mery-presecheniya>

¹¹ Артур Мокряк, Facebook, May 24, 2023, https://www.facebook.com/groups/529968234115857/posts/1686260708486598/?comment_id=1686395721806430.

¹² See “Стрийська Ініціатива--2019,” 2021,” Україна. Стрийська міська Рада Стрийського району Львівської області. X сесія, VIII демократичне скликання, Рішення, 29 липня 2021, № 496, <https://stryi-rada.ukrainia.org.ua/sites/stryi-rada.ukrainia.org.ua/files/inline-files/420.pdf>; Артур Мокряк, Facebook, May 24, 2023, https://www.facebook.com/groups/529968234115857/posts/1686260708486598/?comment_id=1686395721806430.

¹³ Антон Геращенко, “Вовк в овечій шкурі,” *Інтерфакс-Україна*, May 16, 2023. <https://interfax.com.ua/news/blog/910515.html>.

REFERENCES

- “Who are the Freedom of Russia Legion and other armed fighters in Belgorod?” *Reuters*, May 23, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-are-armed-fighters-russias-belgorod-region-2023-05-23/>.
- “Арест Князева: ВАКС рассмотрит апелляцию касательно избранной меры пресечения,” *Focus*, May 29, 2023, <https://focus.ua/ukraine/569311-arest-knyazeva-vaks-rassmotrit-apellyaciyu-kasatelno-izbrannoy-mery-presecheniya>.
- “Москаль: На Институтской Были Снайперы ‘Омеги’ и ‘Сокола,’” *Insider*, February 2, 2014, <http://www.theinsider.ua/rus/politics/530b14080753b/>.
- “Олександр Музичко,” *Wikipedia*, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oleksandr_Muzychko.
- “Русский добровольческий корпус»--это подразделение ВСУ? Российские партизаны? Или агенты ФСБ?” *Meduza*, March 2, 2023, <https://meduza.io/feature/2023/03/02/russkiy-dobrovolcheskiy-korpus-eto-podrazdelenie-vsurossiyskie-partizany-ili-agenty-fsb>.
- “Стрийська Ініціатива--2019,” 2021,” Україна. Стрийська міська Рада Стрийського району Львівської області. X сесія, VIII демократичне скликання, Рішення, 29 липня 2021, № 496, <https://stryi-rada.ukrainia.org.ua/sites/stryi-rada.ukrainia.org.ua/files/inline-files/420.pdf>; Артур Мокряк, Facebook, May 24, 2023.
- Mason. Paul. *Why It’s Still Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions*. London: Verso, 2013.
- Shkliarevsky, Gennady. “Rethinking Democracy: A Systems Perspective on the Global Unrest.” *Systems Research and Behavioral Science*, vol. 33, no. 3 (2016), pp. 452–70.

Sitrin, M. “Goals without Demands: The New Movements for Real Democracy.” *South Atlantic Quarterly*, vol. 113, no. 2 (2014), pp. 245–58;

Геращенко, Антон. “Вовк в овечій шкірі.” *Інтерфакс-Україна*, May 16, 2023.
<https://interfax.com.ua/news/blog/910515.html>.

Калиновская, Дарья. “‘Ультиматум Яроша’: как отреагировали МВД, Ляшко и, что им ответил ‘Правый сектор,’” *056.ua* (Сайт міста Дніпра), August 17, 2014, <https://www.056.ua/news/599314/ultimatum-arosa-kak-otreagirovali-mvd-lasko-i-cto-im-otvetil-pravyj-sektor-video>.

Мокряк, Артур. Facebook, May 24, 2023,
https://www.facebook.com/groups/529968234115857/posts/1686260708486598/?comment_id=1686395721806430

Ярош, Дмитро. “Трошки про державотворення.” *InfoResist*, May 26, 2023,
<https://inforesist.org/ua/troshki-pro-derzhavotvorennya/>
